The integration of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) with IT systems has increased the ICS' exposure to cyber threats. We have seen a tremendous increase in the number of security incidents happened to ICS in the past five years. This requires the ICS to provide effective incident response capabilities to counteract security attacks. Previous research on ICS incident response has been focusing on incident detection and analysis. This paper examines the current ICS incident response procedure from a managerial perspective, identifies the unique characteristics of ICS incident response and proposes a framework to improve incident response capabilities. In particular, it evaluates the benefit of agile values to address specific characteristics of ICS Incident Response. This foundational work sets the scene for future research to apply agile practices into ICS Incident Response.
INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are command and control networks and systems designed to control industrial processes, typically including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). Contemporary industrial control systems have transformed from isolated systems to open architectures, and highly interconnected with other networks (e.g., corporate networks and the Internet) to facilitate and improve business processes. The consequence of this development is the increased vulnerability to computer networkbased attacks. According to Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Readiness Team (ICS-CERT), the number of industrial control systems (ICS) security incidents in 2014 (245 incidents) (Homeland Security 2014) was more than seven times their 2010 level (39 incidents) (Homeland Security 2010) . This new environment, and the realisation that these systems operate most of our critical national infrastructure, calls for more secure implementations and better security solutions. The ability to prevent, detect, analyse and learn from ICS security incident is crucial. Toward this direction, ICS incident response has become an area of significant importance. In this paper we develop a framework for agile incident response processes, based on the realisation that the empirical process theory that forms the theoretical foundation of agile methods explicitly supports the rapid learning and adaptation to embrace changing requirements.
There are rich incident response best practices and researches available in IT systems such the best practices provided by ENISA, NIST, SANS and CERTS. Special precautions must be taken when introducing these same solutions to ICS environments as their operational requirements differ significantly from traditional IT systems. Security solutions need to be tailored to the ICS environment as these value safety, availability, and maintainability with more emphasis than IT systems' confidentiality, integrity and availability (Stouffer et al. 2011 ). This has resulted in different strategies to handle security incidents in terms of change management (e.g. patch update), expertise requirement (e.g. expertise in both control systems and IT systems) (Homeland Security 2009), collaboration capacity (e.g. different stakeholders) (Stouffer et al. 2011) and incident knowledge delivery (incident exchange) (Pauna et al. 2013) . Current research in incident response focuses on the incident detection and analysis (Alcaraz 2012 not leverage opportunities to study the effectiveness of incident response procedures (Shedden et al. 2009 ). This paper examines ICS incident response procedure from a managerial perspective and investigates ways to improve incident response proficiency through an agile approach.
Considering the characteristics of ICS incident response, we integrate agile principles (Beck et al. 2001 ) as ways to improve ICS incident response capabilities. Section 2 reviews the current work of ICS incident response. Section 3 investigates how agile principles can be integrated to address the characteristics of ICS incident response. Section 4 summarises the paper and discusses future work.
ICS INCIDENT RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

ICS Security and Incident Response
ICS security has been widely studied. Nicholson (Nicholson et al. 2012 ) has surveyed on going research and provided a overview of the threats, risks and mitigation strategies of SCADA systems. These researches have provided the basis for ICS security management. Current research in ICS incident response focuses on intrusion detection (Alcaraz 2012 ). However, less work can be found into the research on effective incident response procedures. Effective incident response allows organisations to effectively respond to, eradicate, recover and learn from security attacks perpetrated against them. There is a need to research into ICS incident response procedures and understand how their unique characteristics impact on the effectiveness of more established procedures.
Security Characteristics of ICS
Typical incident response lifecycles in ICS are the same as IT incident response which includes prevention, preparation, planning, incident management, recovery, mitigation, remediation, post incident analysis, and lessons learned. Current ICS incident response best practices suggest to follow IT incident response guidance. However, ICS security is different from IT security (Stouffer et al. 2011) in its objective that, whilst focusing on the containment of the incident and recovery is clearly trading of preservation of evidential data against the need of restoring function and services. This makes it impractical to adopt them without considering the more specialised characteristics of ICS incident response.
ICS highly relies on individual expertise. ICS has complex integration with IT systems and physical system. The personnel responsible for operating, securing, and maintaining ICS is required to have diversified expertise to understand interdependencies (Homeland Security 2009). Moreover, ICS values human safety and fault tolerance over data confidentiality and distinguishes itself from traditional IT by the physical impact and longer recovery times that are the result of physical damage caused to infrastructures. Individuals are also required to understand the important links between safety and security (Stouffer et al. 2011) , primarily the realisation that safety systems are a prime target for cyber security attacks and that many safety systems and indeed methodologies to design these systems do not consider deliberate failures of components.
ICS change management is complicated. System availability is a primary concern and ICS processes are always continuous in nature. Frequent software patching and updates are not suitable for ICS and in many cases not feasible to deploy at all. Pre-deployment testing needs to be performed by the vendor of the industrial control application and the end user of the application. Here the responsibilities and authorities between component suppliers, integrators, vendors are not clearly defined and the system level impact of a patch is difficult to assess and test from the suppliers or the operators point of view. The cost of validating frequent changes is for many operators prohibitive and without regulatory pressures will fall victim of market pressures. This means that better simulation and emulation environments need to be in place that can accurately model the impact of patches and system updates as changes to production ICS often must be planned days/weeks in advance (Stouffer et al. 2011) , and can be very difficult to undo in case of subsequent malfunctions.
ICS values collaboration. ICS incident response requires a collaborative effort between management, the controls engineer and operator, the IT organisation, and a trusted automation advisor and the other roles in the organisation (Homeland Security 2009) . As the cultures of control engineering and IT are often significantly different and unknown to each other, cross-cultural understanding and cooperation will be essential for the development of a collaborative security incident response team (Stouffer et al. 2011 ). In addition many ICS systems are interconnected or at least have dependencies on each other. So for example transport systems will not operate without fuel and also are sensitive to power outages. In coordinated attacks against critical national infrastructures also coordinated responses are required emphasising again the need for collaboration in the incident response process.
ICS incident exchange plays an important role. The main delivery of incident response is the security knowledge generated throughout this process that can be reused for preventing future attacks 96 (Ahmad et al. 2013) . This clearly demonstrates the need for organisational learning in which incident response directly informs the activities of cyber defence and readiness. Previous ICS incidents have demonstrated similarities between different countries. Cross-national incident experience sharing is perceivably critical, as similar attacks may be targeting at different countries (Pauna et al. 2013 ). Empirical processes have in the past been successful when operating in highly dynamic environments that are subject to frequent change and uncertain, high risk events that we can observe in the incident response in ICS and SCADA systems.
INTEGRATING AGILE PRINCIPLES AND ICS INCIDENT RESPONSE
Agile ICS incident response
Agile methodologies were first formally introduced into software development in 2001 with the articulation of the Agile Manifesto. It provides numerous benefits to an organisation, which includes reduced costs, reduced risk, better product quality, higher customer satisfaction, and flexible response to change (Beck et al. 2001) . The Agile Manifesto established a common set of values and principles. It details 12 principles supporting four core values. Agile Manifesto was found to be useful in IT incident response (Grispos et al. 2014 ). This paper primarily focuses on the unique characteristics of ICS and explore how agile principles can be integrated into ICS incident response.
Agile Values and ICS Incident Response
Individuals and interactions are valued over processes and tools. The Agile Manifesto emphasises on individuals and interactions over processes and tools (Beck et al. 2001 ). Werlinger (Werlinger et al.2010 ) and Casey (Casey 2005 ) also suggest that individuals are one of the key factors affecting the success or failure of security incident response. Due to the complexity of the ICS system, that involves IT systems security, physical security and control systems security, incident handling cannot solely rely on pre-defined processes and tools (Pauna et al. 2013) . Individuals' expertise and judgment are very important for making security response decisions.
Working software over comprehensive documentation. Instead of comprehensive documentation, working software has become the primary measure of progress (Beck et al. 2001) . ICS has generated huge amount of incident reports during security incident investigation. These are important deliverables that can be used for learning and preventing future attacks. However, this amount of information makes it difficult for security experts to review and learn from previous incidents. Although some attempts have been made to represent security knowledge structurally (He et al. 2012 ) ) ) , working software should also consider incident knowledge generation and sharing. Cross-national incident exchange is perceivably critical, as similar ICS attacks have and may be targeted across different countries (Pauna et al. 2013) .
Customer collaboration over contract negotiation. Agile approaches encourage the collaboration between different stakeholders to ensure that customers are satisfied with the product through regular reviews and inspections (Beck et al. 2001) . This calls for the cooperation between various stakeholder groups such as security, technology and legal roles for forensic investigations. Moreover, as the cultures of control engineering and IT are often significantly different and unknown to the other party. A security incident response process would benefit from collaborative work between incident response teams and other roles within an organisation (Ahmad et al. 2013 ).
Responding to change over following a plan. Agile approaches welcome changing requirements. Being flexible and agile to change is highly valued in an agile process (Beck et al. 2001) . The integration of agile principles and practices aims to provide a security incident response team with the ability to respond quickly to changes. This is consistent with the current call of H2020 that requires to reduce ICS incident response time (European Commission 2015) . By its very nature Incident Response needs to be adaptive to a highly dynamic nature of cyber attacks and anticipate further exploitation paths of the adversaries. The definition of very procedural incident response processes would make this more difficult to achieve and also increase the predictability of the defence efforts.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
ICS security is different from IT security. Incident response management cannot be directly applied in ICS. To address these problems, this paper examines the current IT incident response procedure from a managerial perspective, identifies the specific characteristics of ICS incident response and explores ways to improve ICS incident management. A possible solution is the integration of Agile best practices into the ICS incident response process. This paper highlights the integration of agile values and how agile values can potentially improve ICS incident response. Future research will be business case studies on whether the integration of agile values can improve ICS incident response procedure 97 through the implementation of exploratory industrial field studies. Future research also includes the selection and evaluation of specific technical and management controls to allow for agile ICS incident response. We will be mapping traditional incident response processes to existing agile frameworks such as Scrum or Kanban to address issues in coordination and prioritisation of incident response tasks in line with the coordination of multiple product owners in Scrum teams and introduce incident response coaches to facilitate best practice within incident teams, mimicking the role of a Scrummaster.
